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Interest to enforce Real Burdens: 
how material is “material”?
To enforce a real burden it has always been necessary to have interest as well as title. 
But under the former law the issue was rarely a live one, because burdens were typically 
enforced by feudal superiors, whose interest was presumed and virtually impossible 
to rebut.1 That has now changed. Section 8 of the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 
2003 provides that: “A real burden is enforceable by any person who has both title 
and interest to enforce it”; and a person has such interest, in the normal case, if and 
only if
in the circumstances of any case, failure to comply with the real burden is resulting in, or 
will result in, material detriment to the value or enjoyment of the person’s ownership of, or 
right in, the benefi ted property.
This provision allows for two possibilities: there must be material detriment either to 
the value of the benefi ted property, or to its enjoyment. And in both cases the guardian 
against inappropriate enforcement is the word “material”. Only detriment which is 
“material” will justify enforcement. Anything less must be endured with the fortitude 
which is to be expected of a good neighbour.
But how material is “material”? The word itself does not carry a single and precise 
meaning. The Oxford English Dictionary offers “of serious or substantial import” but 
also, more weakly, “signifi cant” and “of consequence”.2 On one view, “material” is 
simply the opposite of “immaterial”,3 but this does little to advance matters, merely 
shifting the uncertainty of meaning from one word to another. An alternative, but 
perhaps no more helpful, approach is to say that there is an undistributed middle 
between “material” and “immaterial” leading to a tripartite classifi cation of (i) material 
(ii) immaterial and (iii) neither material nor immaterial. In the absence of precise 
meaning, context is naturally of particular importance, so that the question is not what 
“material” means in the abstract but rather what it means in the context in which it 
appears in the Title Conditions Act.     
A. BARKER v LEWIS
The meaning of “material detriment” in section 8 has now been the subject of judicial 
decision. Barker v Lewis4 concerned a recent development of fi ve houses at Cauldside 
Farm Steadings, about two miles from St Andrews. Access was by a private road. The 
development was regulated by a deed of conditions which, among other restrictions, 
limited the use of each house to “a domestic dwellinghouse with relative offi ces only 
1 K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 408.
2 The online version of the Oxford English Dictionary was consulted. This is a revised and updated version 
of the second edition of 1989.
3 As was argued, unsuccessfully, by the pursuers in Barker v Lewis 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 48.
4 2007 SLT (Sh Ct) 48.
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and for use by one family only and for no other purpose whatsoever”. The “tranquil 
location” promised by the developer’s brochure appeared under threat when one of 
the owners began to use her house for a bed-and-breakfast business.5 Eventually, the 
owners of three of the other houses sought interdict. The sheriff6 accepted that the 
business was in breach of the burden in the deed of conditions, and that there was 
title to enforce.7 The question of interest, however, was seen as more diffi cult. It was 
true that life for the pursuers had been made less pleasant. The defender’s business 
attracted around 250 visitors a year, leading to more traffi c, increased noise from late 
arrivals and early departures, some inappropriate parking, and a general loss of privacy 
and peace. The disturbance was increased by the secluded nature of the development, 
and the fact that the houses were close together. Nevertheless, the sheriff concluded 
that the pursuers had failed to show interest to enforce, and interdict was refused.
On the evidence as summarised in the judgment, this was a rather unexpected 
result, although it was evidently a close one, with the sheriff indicating that if the 
number of guests were to increase in the future, “there is a real risk” of material detri-
ment to the pursuers’ enjoyment of their properties.8 More important, however, is the 
general approach which the sheriff chose to adopt. His decision may be said to have 
rested on three main propositions. First, “material” detriment means “substantial” 
detriment. Secondly, in interpreting “material” it is helpful to have regard to the law of 
nuisance. Thirdly, in assessing detriment arising out of non-compliance with a burden 
it is relevant to consider what detriment might have arisen even if there had been 
full compliance. While the sheriff deserves sympathy for having to grapple with these 
issues for the fi rst time, there are real diffi culties with the approach he chose to adopt. 
Taken singly, each of the propositions seems open to question, while, taken together, 
they present a model of interest to enforce which is unconvincing as well as damaging 
to the future usefulness of real burdens.  
B. THE THREE PROPOSITIONS
The fi rst proposition was that “material” means “substantial”. That, said the sheriff, 
was the “plain meaning” of the word.9 But the truth is that there no “plain meaning” 
of “material” – as already seen – so that it is always necessary to consider the context 
in which it is used. In fact, the Title Conditions Act uses both “material” and “substan-
tial”, and is careful to do so in different ways. “Material” detriment is the test for 
interest to enforce, but when it comes to compensation for variation or discharge by 
the Lands Tribunal the test is “substantial” loss or disadvantage.10 The hierarchy which 
these words imply is obvious. Where detriment or disadvantage reaches the point of 
being “material”, there is interest to enforce; but it is only when it is raised to the level 
5 See www.millhouse-standrews.com/.
6 Sheriff G J Evans.
7 On this point the sheriff’s judgment contains an interesting discussion (at 54-55) of the extent to which 
Low v Scottish Amicable Building Society 1940 SLT 295 is consistent with the decision of the First Divi-
sion in Colquhoun’s CB v Glen’s Tr 1920 SC 737.
8 At 51F (fi nding in fact and in law 9).
9 At 55E.
10 Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 s 90(7)(a).
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of “substantial” that compensation is due, in the event of variation or discharge by the 
Tribunal. And because disadvantage is rarely “substantial”, the experience of the last 
30 years is that compensation is rarely awarded.11 In this connection it seems worth 
observing that, as originally enacted, section 20 of the Abolition of Feudal Tenure 
etc (Scotland) Act 2000 (which allowed the Lands Tribunal to reallot feudal burdens 
in certain cases) imposed a criterion of “substantial” disadvantage, but that this was 
changed to “material” detriment by the Title Conditions Act.12 The distinction can also 
be found in other provisions of the Title Conditions Act. For example, while section 
16(1) requires “material expenditure” whose benefi t has been “substantially” lost, as 
a condition of acquiescence, section 54(3) defi nes a “sheltered or retirement housing 
development” as one containing houses with facilities “substantially” different from 
those of ordinary houses.
The second proposition linked interest to enforce to nuisance. The result, according 
to the sheriff,13 would be that
in order to fi nd that the disputed activity of the burdened proprietor has resulted, or will 
result, in material detriment to the enjoyment of the benefi ted property, the court must 
be satisfi ed that the result has been, or will be, more than just sentimental, speculative, 
trivial discomfort or personal annoyance and that it amounts to substantial inconvenience 
or annoyance, as judged by the objective standard of what would affect a proprietor of 
ordinary sensibility and susceptibility and taking into account both the existing character of 
the locality affected and the extent to which the benefi ted and the burdened properties are 
geographically  interconnected.
These words are drawn from the law of nuisance and, in part, are a direct quote from 
the speech of the Earl of Selborne in one of the leading Victorian cases.14 The linkage, 
however, is problematic. For on the one hand, if the test for interest to enforce is the 
same as the test for nuisance, real burdens would be superfl uous in respect of matters 
which would in any event be governed by nuisance. Conveyancers would have been 
wasting their time in putting real burdens into deeds. But on the other hand, if the test 
is different, as appears to be the case, then the linkage is unhelpful and misleading. 
The leading modern account of nuisance lists materiality as only one of the six factors 
which may be relevant in order to determine whether a nuisance has occurred.15 
There are other objections as well. There is nothing in the Act, or in the report 
which lies behind it,16 to warrant recourse to the law of nuisance. Nor is it evident 
why a doctrine of the common law should be thought of as being of assistance in a 
matter of statutory interpretation. Finally, the suggested linkage tells us nothing about 
11 Sir Crispin Agnew of Lochnaw, Variation and Discharge of Land Obligations (1999) ch 7. The experi-
ence under the Title Conditions Act has been the same: see J & L Leisure Ltd v Shaw, 28 March and 
25 August 2006, Lands Tribunal; West Coast Property Developments Ltd v Clarke 28 June 2006, Lands 
Tribunal.
12 Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 Sch 13 para 4, amending s 20(7)(a) of the 2000 Act.
13 At 55H.
14 Fleming v Hislop (1886) 13 R (HL) 43 at 45.
15 N R Whitty, “Nuisance”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue (2001) para 
43. Surprisingly, this work is not referred to by the sheriff in Barker v Lewis.
16 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Real Burdens (Scot Law Com No 181 (2000); available on www.
scotlawcom.gov.uk) paras 4.16-4.24.
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the meaning of “material” in the many cases where the content of the burden has no 
parallel in the law nuisance – for example, in the standard case of a prohibition on 
building.
The sheriff’s third proposition has a certain intuitive attractiveness. Evidently, the 
disturbance caused by the prohibited use (as a B & B) was no worse than might be 
caused by other use which would be freely permitted under the titles (e.g. use by a 
large family). “On a change of ownership”, the sheriff pointed out, the pursuers “might 
end up with a nosey, intrusive neighbour with a large family who all possess peculiar 
noisy habits and hobbies”.17 The reasoning, however, is fl awed. The risk of a noisy 
family is one which, under the titles, the pursuers are bound to take. But they are not 
bound to take the risk of noisy guests in a B & B.
C. CONCLUSION
Each proposition in Barker v Lewis raises the bar for interest to enforce; cumulatively, 
they raise the bar too high. Although authority under the former law was meagre 
and not always easily reconciled, there was little doubt that, for immediate neigh-
bours at least, there was interest to enforce most burdens most of the time.18 That 
is as it should be, for otherwise real burdens would be largely pointless. Admittedly, 
section 8 provides a more exacting test than the former law,19 especially for those 
whose property lies at a distance.20 But interest should not be treated as a mode of 
extinction.21 The task of measuring gain against pain is one for the Lands Tribunal and 
not for the ordinary courts.22 A person wishing to be relieved of a burden should apply 
to the Tribunal or make use of one of the other methods of variation and extinction 
which the Act provides. At least in a question with immediate neighbours, it should 
not normally be possible to shelter behind an absence of interest to enforce.23   
Kenneth G C Reid
University of Edinburgh
17 At 57A.
18 Reid, Property (n 1) para 407.
19 R Rennie, “Real burdens – a question of interest” 2007 SLT (News) 89 at 93.
20 In the Scottish Law Commission’s original version of what is now s 8, “the distance between the bene-
fi ted and burdened properties” was singled out as a factor of particular importance: see Report on Real 
Burdens (n 16) para 4.18.  
21 Any more than interpretation is a mode of extinction: see Scottish Law Commission, Report on Real 
Burdens (n 16) para 4.62. Hence s 14 of the Act.
22 Thus the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003 s 100(b), (c) invites the Tribunal to compare “the extent to 
which the condition confers benefi t on the benefi ted property” with “the extent to which the condition 
impedes enjoyment of the burdened property”. For one example among many, see Faeley v Clark 2006 
GWD 28-626.
23 Unless, of course, there is no detriment to the benefi ted property or the detriment is trivial. As the Scot-
tish Law Commission has pointed out (Report on Real Burdens (n 16) para 4.17): “An obligation not to 
build prevents rabbit hutches as well as fi ve-storey blocks of fl ats. But it seems doubtful whether there 
is interest to prevent the building of rabbit hutches, even on the part of an immediate neighbour”.
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